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In years past, the growth rates of
money measures such as M2 received
considerable attention because evidence
showed that there was a simple and sta-
ble long-run relationship between M2,
nominal income, and inflation. Many
analysts believed that abrupt changes in
money growth induced swings in output,
while changes in the trend rate of money
growth led to changes in the underlying
rate of inflation. Indeed, the view that
M2 is an important monetary policy
guide is reflected in the fact that the Fed-
eral Reserve is required by law to spec-
ify growth ranges for the monetary and
credit aggregates.
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In recent years, however, the reliability
of money measures as indicators of
monetary policy has been called into
question. Since 1990, the relationship
between M2 and the variables men-
tioned above seems to have been perma-
nently disturbed. As a result, policymak-
ers' focus on money measures has
diminished significantly. In July 1993,
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan reported that"... at least for
the time being, M2 has been down-
graded as a reliable indicator of financial
conditions in the economy, and no single
variable has yet been identified to take
its place."
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The latest data, however, suggest that M2
may have begun to regain its value as a
policy indicator. After decelerating for
five successive years, the growth rate of
the aggregate has turned up substantially
in 1995. Year to date, M2 has advanced
at a 4.3 percent annual pace, approaching
the upper end of its Humphrey-Hawkins
specified growth range (see figure 1).
This recent strength raises a number of
questions. Can we infer that the relation-
ship of M2, output, and inflation has
stabilized again? Will M2 regain its lost
status? This Economic Commentary dis-
cusses the breakdown and diminished
role of M2, then looks at evidence sug-
gesting that the relationship among these
variables has indeed been restored.
• The Demand for M2
The link between money and economic
activity has long been succinctly repre-
sented in the quantity theory of money.
In his influential restatement of this idea,
Milton Friedman argues that "the quan-
tity theory is in the first instance a theory
of money demand."
3 Simply put, the
notion is that over the long run, money-
balance holders tend to demand a level
of balances proportionate to their
income. Providing a steady supply of
money equal to that demanded should
thereby foster noninflationary economic
growth. It was largely on the belief that
money demand is one of the most stable
and reliable relationships in economics
that money measures earned their status
in the monetary policy process.
From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s,
the demand for M2 was perceived to be
reasonably stable and the most reliable of
In recent years, M2 growth has been
unusually weak. This aberrant
behavior led to its demise as the pri-
mary indicator of monetary policy.
Although the aggregate has been
behaving more normally over the
past year or so, it seems unlikely that
it will soon regain its earlier stature
as a key policy guide.
the alternative money measures. M2 and
nominal GDP had grown at approxi-
mately the same rate over the previous
30 years, suggesting a simple and endur-
ing relationship that provided policymak-
ers with a reliable and uncomplicated
framework for setting monetary targets.
This relationship is summarized by the
trendless long-run average of M2 veloc-
ity, defined as the ratio of GDP to M2.
Although M2 velocity had been trend-
less in the long run, it exhibited consid-
erable variation in the short run. Most of
this variation, however, was associated
with changes in the opportunity cost of
holding M2 deposits, defined as the dif-
ference between short-term market inter-
est rates and the rate of return on M2
deposits (see figure 2). Specifically, an
increase in the opportunity cost of
M2 encourages balance holders to shed
M2 deposits in favor of higher-yielding
alternatives. Hence, M2 deposits are
pared down and velocity increases.
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• The Demise of M2
Beginning in 1990, however, M2 growth
began to slow despite a considerable re-
duction in its opportunity cost. At the
same time, M2 velocity remained unex-
pectedly high. Although part of the M2
slowdown reflected a weakened econ-
omy, the magnitude of the downturn
could not be reconciled with the aggre-
gate's demand framework or with the his-
torical experience of its velocity. For the
next three years, velocity began to drift
upward, even though M2 opportunity
cost fell. As this anomaly persisted, it
became apparent that the estimated rela-
tionship linking M2, its opportunity cost,
and nominal GDP had broken down.
Most standard M2 demand models began
to substantially overpredict M2 (see
figure 3).
A fundamental factor underlying the
aggregate's weakness relates to the
credit-market restructuring that occurred
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Specifically, the troubles faced by many
financial intermediaries—most notably
savings and loans—placed them in a
position where they could not assume
any additional risk. Consequently, such
depositories were forced to tighten their
lending standards. Investors seeking
financing for marginal business opportu-
nities had to look elsewhere for funds or
else abandon their projects. With limited
loan expansion, depositories found little
need for funds and hence did not price
deposits attractively.
Another relevant factor was the steepen-
ing in the maturity structure of interest
rates. A weakened economy and higher
lending standards in the early 1990s ulti-
mately led short-term interest rates to
fall to levels not seen in years. This dra-
matic downturn was not accompanied by
a one-to-one decline in long-term inter-
est rates. As a result, long-term instru-
ments were paying significantly more
than short-term instruments.
FIGURE 1 THE M2 AGGREGATE




a. Growth rates are percentage rates calculated on a fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter basis.
Annualized growth rate for 1995 is calculated on a November over 1994:IVQ basis.
NOTE: Last plot is for November 1995. Dotted lines represent M2 growth ranges and are for
reference only.
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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The wide divergence between long- and
short-term yields acted as a catalyst for
financial innovation. Chief among these
innovations were instruments that re-
duced the transaction costs of bond
mutual funds and increased their access-
ibility to households. This allowed indi-
viduals to buy into a diversified port-
folio of long-term bonds with check-
writing privileges that made the funds
quite liquid.
Bond mutual funds are subject to capital
losses in the short run, but in the long
run, they yield relatively higher rates
than do deposit instruments. When short-
term interest rates were falling in the
early 1990s, marketing strategies encour-
aged households to learn about bond
mutual funds, which were yielding sig-
nificantly higher returns. As a result,
many Americans chose, for the first time,
to move some of their wealth from M2
deposits to bond funds. It now appearsFIGURE 4 M2 VELOCITY
Ratio
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that for many of these people, bond funds
have become a permanent and significant
part of their portfolios, supplanting bank
CDs (previously the only major form of
financial wealth for most households).
• Efforts to Salvage M2
The breakdown of the relationship
between M2, nominal income, and
opportunity cost provoked substantial
research. One Federal Reserve Board
study sought to correct the problem by
improving the opportunity-cost
measure.
4 Specifically, this approach
accounted for a broader menu of alterna-
tive rates—including some longer-term
interest rates—in an M2 demand model.
Although the extended opportunity-cost
model improved out-of- sample predic-
tion performance, it started to overpre-
dict money demand in mid-1993, when
long-term interest rates fell dramatically.
Other researchers tried to redefine the
M2 aggregate to include additional
instruments such as bond mutual funds.
5
Models using these broader measures
were able to explain some of the M2
shortfall by internalizing part of the sub-
stitution between M2 balances and these
funds. However, adding bond funds to
M2 did not fully restore its relationship
with nominal income and opportunity
cost.
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Finally, with the abrupt turnaround in
interest rates in 1994 and the flattening
of the maturity structure, some analysts
predicted that households might aban-
don bond funds as a form of wealth
holding, especially as capital losses
sharply reduced reported yields.
Although the changing interest-rate
structure stanched the flow of money
into bond funds, there is no evidence of
any significant net outflow. Hence, a
large component of the shift in house-
hold funds from CDs to bond funds
appears to be permanent. The question
remains, however, whether household
portfolio management has stabilized,
and, if so, what that implies for the
future relationship between M2, infla-
tion, and output.
• Has M2 Stabilized?
Preliminary evidence suggests that the
relationship between M2, inflation, and
output may have stabilized. The predic-
tion errors of the M2 demand model
have essentially remained unchanged
since 1992. This is consistent with a per-
manent one-time shift in the level of M2
relative to income. Such an outcome
would be the case if the forces underly-
ing the deceleration of M2—restructur-
ing of the nation's credit markets and
financial innovation—had worked
themselves out, resulting in a one-time
effect on M2 demand.
When the M2 model is reestimated to
allow for such a change, we find that the
historical relationship is largely re-
stored.
7 One implication of this result is
that M2 velocity has stabilized at a new
level, and that its short-run relationship
with M2 opportunity cost is essentially
unchanged.
8 Based on our estimates,
mean M2 velocity increased from
around 1.64 before 1990 to near 1.89
after 1992 (see figure 4). Deviations of
M2 velocity from its estimated mean are
closely linked to changes in its opportu-
nity cost (see figure 5).
We stress, however, that these estimates
are based on a limited amount of data
covering only part of a business cycle;
hence, skepticism about their durability
and precision is warranted. A convincing
case might require the new estimates to
hold up over a wide range of interest-rate
environments, especially one similar to
that which existed around 1990, when
long rates greatly exceeded short rates.
Nevertheless, it seems prudent to begin
monitoring this relationship now.
• Conclusion
Even if M2 continues on a trajectory
consistent with the new, higher level of
velocity, it seems unlikely that it will
soon regain its lost status. One of the
most attractive features of the M2 aggre-
gate—the long-run stability of its veloc-
ity around a fixed value—has been
spoiled. More than 30 years of experi-
ence supported the view that M2 veloc-
ity would ultimately return to its meanvalue of around 1.64. The recent evi-
dence that its velocity is higher is based,
at most, on five years of experience.
Clearly, it will take more time (perhaps
another business cycle) to gain confi-
dence that the new average level approx-
imates a long-run equilibrium value.
Nevertheless, if the recent evidence con-
tinues to hold, then M2 will probably
grow at about the same rate as nominal
income, assuming that interest rates
remain relatively unchanged. Thus, M2
velocity would remain around its current
level. On the other hand, a sharp decline
in interest rates, and hence in the oppor-
tunity cost of M2, could induce a sub-
stantial rise in M2 demand. The conse-
quent reduction in the aggregate's
velocity would be interest-rate induced
and hence would be consistent with the
new stabilized relationship. It seems
highly doubtful, however, that M2 veloc-
ity will return to anywhere near its previ-
ous level.
• Footnotes
1. In February and July of each year, the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee (the main poli-
cymaking arm of the Federal Reserve Board)
sets annual growth ranges for the monetary
and credit aggregates. The Federal Reserve
Board chairman presents these ranges in testi-
mony before Congress pursuant to the
Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978.
2. See 1993 Monetary Policy Objectives:
Summary Report of the Federal Reserve
Board, July 20, 1993, p. 8.
3. See Milton Friedman, "The Quantity
Theory of Money — A Restatement," in
Milton Friedman, ed., Studies in the Quantity
Theory of Money. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1956, pp. 3-21.
4. See Joshua N. Feinman and Richard D.
Porter, "The Continuing Weakness in M2,"
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Finance and Economics Discussion
Series, No. 209, September 1992.
5. See Sean Collins and Cheryl L. Edwards,
"An Alternative Monetary Aggregate: M2
Plus Household Holdings of Bond and Equity
Mutual Funds," Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, Review, November/December 1994,
pp. 7-29.
6. See John V. Duca, "Should Bond Funds
Be Added to M2?" Journal of Banking and
Finance, vol. 19, no. 1 (April 1995), pp.
131-52. See also Athanasios Orphanides,
Brian Reid, and David H. Small, "The Em-
pirical Properties of a Monetary Aggregate
That Adds Bond and Stock Funds to M2,"
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review,
November/December 1994, pp. 31-51.
7. We estimate a one-time level shift in M2
demand of approximately $500 billion,
occurring smoothly over the 1990:IQ to
1992:IVQ period.
8. Indeed, the goodness-of-fit over the whole
sample is superior to that in the sample
period leading up to the level shift.
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